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AESTHETICS UNDER THE ZONING POWER
Municipal zoning is a rapidly expanding and changing field of law.
Its effective development in the United States has only occured within
the last two decades? The sole question dealt with herein is to what
extent zoning laws can be based upon aesthetic values.
To examine the scope of zoning power it is essential to examine the
source of such power, which is the police power. Generally, the police
power of the state is the power to safeguard the safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the public. 2 The problem arises, however, as
to the extent of these objectives. In other words, are restrictive zoning
laws which are based solely or partially upon the grounds of aesthetic
appeal encompassed within these objectives?
The general rule is that aesthetics in themselves cannot justify an
exercise of the police or zoning power that restricts or impairs property
rights.3 However, aesthetic values may be taken into consideration so
long as some phase of public safety, health or morals is involved. 4 The
problem then arises, can aesthetic values be considered along with some
phase of the "general welfare" of the public and thereby form a proper
basis for zoning laws? Since promotion of the general welfare falls
under the police power, there is no apparent reason why beauty could
not be considered together with the general welfare of the community
in establishing zoning laws. But the further question still remains as
to what comprises the area of the "general welfare."
Despite the rule that any infringement upon individual property
rights is to be considered most favorably in favor of the property owner,
the definition of "general welfare" has been expanding, and notably so,
in the area of zoning. Although courts are hesitant to establish aesthe-
tics as a sole ground for zoning laws, they have generally begun to
accept protection of the market value of property as a proper objective
of the police power.5 Our Wisconsin court has recently held valid an
1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, 2nd ed., chap. 1, esp. at p. 6 where it is
stated: "As the needs of a congested society have increased, so has the pres-
sure upon lawmakers increased; and, as an inevitable result, much legislation
-some wise, some unwise-has resulted, having to do with the public health,
safety and morals over a long period of years. Not until recently, however,
and by "recently" we mean within the last quarter of a century, has the law
even begun to keep pace with the concentration of population in the field of
municipal zoning; and only within the last decade has the field of zoning with
reference to municipal esthetics been dignified by the partial sanction of some
courts of last resort."
2 Ibid., at chap. II, esp. at pp. 19 & 20.
3 8 McQuillin, Mnicipal Corporations, 3rd ed., §25.29.
4Ibid., at §25.30.
SIn State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), the court stated:
"Cases from other jurisdictions holding that preservation of property values
are the legitimate objective of zoning ordinances are: Wulfsohn v. Burden,
supra; State ex rel. Berry v. Houghton, 1925, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569,
54 A.L.R. 1012, affirmed 273 U.S. 671, 47 S.Ct. 474, 71 L.Ed. 832; Rice v. Van
Vranken, 1928, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32, affirmed 225 App. Div. 179, 232
1955]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ordinance which requires a finding that the "exterior architectural ap-
peal and functional plan of the proposed structure will not be so at
variance with those of other structures in the immediate neighborhood
as to cause substantial depreciation in property values thereof."6 In so
holding the Wisconsin court made definite a new inroad into the indi-
vidual's property rights. Even though courts have begun to recognize
protection of property values as a proper objective of the police power,
generally they still refuse to validate a zoning law when the basis there-
of is solely aesthetics. 7 In the case of Wulfsohn v. Burden the court
stated:
With few exceptions courts have not been ready to say that they
(zoning laws) might be sustained merely because they preserved
the aesthetic appearance of a private residential district and pre-
vented it from being blotched by the erection of some incongruous
structure whereby the value of all neighboring property was
impaired."
Generally, some more direct relation than aesthetic to the public safety,
health, morals or welfare was required.9
In the Wisconsin case cited above, the trial court (which was over-
ruled) had followed the strict and accepted interpretation of the police
power as set down in American Jurisprudence and approved in prior
Wisconsin decisions:
Zoning restrictions on the general rights of a land owner are
imposed in the exercise of the police power, and to justify the
exercise of such governmental power, the zoning restrictions
imposed must bear a substantial relation to, or be reasonably
necessary for, the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.'0
N.Y.S. 506; Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 1952, 10 N.J. 165, 89
A.2d 693, 698, appeal dismissed January 19, 1953 for want of substantial fed-
eral question 344 U.S. 919, 73 S.Ct. 386, 97 L.Ed. 708."
In Griggs v. City of Patterson, 132 N.J.L. 145, 39 A.2d 231, 232 (1944), it was
stated: "The proper purpose of zoning is 'Conserving the value of property
and encouraging the most appropriate use of the land.' Gabrielson v. Glen
Ridge, 176 Atl. 676, 679, 13 N.J. Misc. 142."
8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., §25.25, states: "The stabiliza-
tion, conservation and protection of uses and values of land and buildings, in-
cluding residential, commercial, trade, industrial and all uses and values re-
lating thereto, constitute fundamental purposes of zoning, reasonably related
to the public welfare."
6 State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
7 See supra, note 3.8 Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651 (1925).
9 See supra, note 3.
10 58 Am. Jur. 955; See also: Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12
N.W.2d 387, 149 A.L.R. 1443 (1943), where the court stated: "It is requisite
to the validity of a zoning ordinance that the restrictions to be imposed tend,
in some degree at least, to promote public health, morals, safety or welfare."
This rule was approved in Geisenfeld v. Shorewood, 232 Wis. 410, 417, 287
N.W. 683 (1939).
See also: Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926), in which it
was stated: "In interpreting police regulations they must be interpreted in the
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In applying this rule to the preservation of property values on the
grounds of architectural appeal, the trial court stated:
By no reasonable view of the matter could it be considered that
the ordinance and its enforcement tend to promote public health,
safety, morals or general welfare."'
This narrow interpretation of the "general welfare" was set aside by
the Wisconsin supreme court when it said:
. . . is the objective of an ordinance in the nature of a zoning
regulation, which seeks to protect or preserve property values,
embraced within the term "general welfare?" It is the conten-
tion of counsel for relator that it is not, because such an ordin-
ance does not tend to promote public health, safety, or morals.
We consider this as entirely too restrictive an interpretation of
the term "general welfare." As pointed out by the New York
court of appeals in Wulfsohn v. Burden, 1925, 241 N.Y. 288,
150 N.E. 120, 122, 43 A.L.R. 651:
The [police] power is not limited to regulations designed
to promote public health, public morals, or public safety,
or to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or
unsanitary, but extends to so dealing with conditions
which exists as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity.' 2
Under this broad interpretation, the question simply becomes whether
protection of property values by restrictions on architectural designing
will promote the "greatest welfare of the people."
It can readily be seen that a variance of architecture and exterior
appearance of one building can lower the value of the surrounding
property. A building with a flat roof and creosote block in an old
residential area would be objectionable. A house the design of which is
in the shape of a ship would adversly affect values in a respectible resi-
dential area. A one-story, fiat-roof modem house would not conform
to homes which are two or three-story colonial or English type. A
house that is built in a circle is generally not accepted and causes a
question mark in the minds of prospective purchasers. Any building
that could be considered an eyesore would lower the value of the
surrounding property. This means that a person with a $30,000 in-
vestment in his home could have his property value lowered to $15,000
through no fault of his own. It is this right which the more recent
decisions are endeavoring to uphold.
It should be noted that this is an indirect use of aesthetic appeal as
light of the conditions and circumstances and the particular needs and situa-
tion of the particular community, and if in the light of these conditions, the
legislation cannot be said to have no relationship to health, safety and the gen-
eral welfare, then the legislation must be sustained and held valid"'
22 State v. Wieland, A. Ap. 111; R. 44, 1955.
12 See supra, note 6.
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a basis for zoning restrictions. The architectural design, itself, does
not justify the restriction. It is because the architectural design will
lower the value of the surrounding property that the laws are justified.
The state cannot force a community to build all colonial style or all
English style homes, but it can and must protect the property interests
of the community. Thus, under the Wisconsin rule, aesthetics in archi-
tectural appeal indirectly are a basis for zoning laws today.1 3
There has, however, been no blank acceptance of the rule that
preservation of property values will justify all zoning laws in rela-
tion to aesthetics. 14 We have discussed the problem of architectural
appeal. There is also the question of size. That is, can the state main-
tain the appearance of a prosperous neighborhood by requiring a mini-
mum cubic footage in its zoning laws? Of course, health and safety
demand some minimum of cubic footage in every residence. But
doesn't the cubic footage depend on the type of building, the number
of persons living therein, and a number of other factors which forbid
any blanket minimum from being established?
There is a line of cases which have justified such zoning laws. 15
In a North Dakota case' 6 a zoning ordinance restricting the size of
buildings was held to be authorized and not unreasonable or arbitrary.
In the case of Thompson v. City of Carrollton17 the court sustained an
ordinance prescribing a minimum of 900 square feet of floor space. In
Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha' the court sustained an ordinance
providing for 1000 square feet of minimum floor area for one-story
dwellings and 1200 square feet for more than one-story dwellings. In
Flower Hill Building Corp. v. Village of Flower Hill19 the court de-
clined to declare invalid on its face a requirement in an ordinance of
an 1800 square foot minimum. All of these cases rely primarily upon
health in justifying such zoning laws under the police power. Yet the
variance of the minimum required in these cases leads one to believe
that something besides health was taken into consideration.
A sounder position on this question of health as it relates to mini-
mum floor area requirements is taken by the Michigan courts. In one
case the law demanded a minimum of 1300 square feet while the plain-
3 Ibid.
148 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., §25.25, where it is stated: "On
the other hand, it has been said that the conservation of property values is not
by itself a proper sole objective for the exercise of the police power by the
enactment of a zoning ordinance."
15 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, 2nd ed., §169, where it is stated: "The
more recent tendency of the courts, however, has been to recognize and ap-
prove the validity of such provisions (of minimum cubic footage) where based
upon a factual premise in support of adequate standards."
16 City of Bismark v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
17 (Tex. Civ. App.), 211 S.W.2d 970 (1948).
' 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944).
'9 199 Misc. 344, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1950).
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tiff land owner wished to build a home consisting of 980 square feet.
After demonstrating the allocation of the space in plaintiff's proposed
building, the court stated:
The above allocation of floor area would leave in plaintiff's
proposed 980 square feet a balance of 188 square feet of floor
area for miscellaneous use in closets, toilets or enlargement of
any of the rooms above suggested. A multiplicity of like de-
signs might be suggested; but from the above it is obvious that
a home can be constructed which is adequate in every sense in
so far as requirements can be made under the guise of exercis-
ing the police power. The restrictions in this ordinance as ap-
plied to the situation as presented by this record in no way
promotes or protects in this subdivision public health, safety,
morals or welfare. Its application to plaintiff's property is not
only unreasonable but is also an unjust limitation of a reasonable
and lawful use of his property.20
In Frischkorn Construction Co. v. Lambert2 ' a provision of a township
zoning ordinance requiring that single dwellings constructed in a cer-
tain zone contain at least 14,000 cubic feet could not be enforced
against an owner desiring to construct houses containing only 12,556
cubic feet but which complied with the state housing law, where the
purpose of the provision was to maintain property values in that zone
and not to promote the public health, safety or welfare.
The leading case taking this view is Elizabeth Lake Estates v.
Waterford Township decided in 1947. The zoning law required a
minimum of 15,000 cubic feet whereas plaintiff's building plan only
called for 11,832 cubic feet. The court held:
... the ordinance requirement as to cubical content may not be
enforced against plaintiff, insofar as the construction here in-
volved is concerned, for the purpose of establishing or main-
taining property values within the zone affected. Rather, the
test is whether the "public health, safety or welfare" would be
promoted thereby.2
2
The court pointed out that each case must be decided upon its own facts,
and that plaintiff's home fulfilled all the requirements of health and
safety. Thus, the court went on to say, the ordinance had the effect
of prohibiting, houses being erected below a certain sum. Such law is,
in effect, discrimination against persons of a lower income bracket.
Here we reach the basic conflict in reasoning. On the one hand a man
should not be forced to build a home larger than that required by the
minimum restrictions as to health and safety. On the other hand the
surrounding property owners, who have a right to their just property
20 Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W2d 387 (1943). See also: 149 A.L.R.
1433.
21315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946).
22 Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Township, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W2d 788
(1947).
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interests, will suffer loss of property value if unreasonable non-con-
formity as to size of structure is practiced.
It should be noted that Michigan represents the extreme view on
this question of aesthetics in zoning. In the above case the court con-
cluded:
The conservation of property values is not by itself made a
proper sole objective for the exercise of police power under the
statute.23
The court did not decide whether it would sustain a zoning law based
on architectural appeal, but from the above language it is extremtly
doubtful whether any zoning law to preserve property values, whether
it be based upon architectural appeal or minimum cubic footage, would
be upheld.
The foremost contrary authority to the above "Michigan viewpoint"
is the celebrated Lionshead case 24 which overruled at least one previous
case 25 in New Jersey. The ordinance fixed a minimum living floor
space of 768 square feet for a one-story dwelling, 1000 square feet for
a two-story dwelling having an attached garage and not less than 1200
square feet for a two-story dwelling not having an attached garage.
After much preliminary maneuvering in the lower courts, the case
finally reached the Supreme Court where the provisions were upheld
in a decision in which the issues were squarely raised and decided.
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, speaking for the majority in this case, sus-
tained the minimum floor area provision as reasonably related to the
recognized statutory purposes of zoning, i.e., the preservation of health
and the stabilization of property values. In the course of his opinion
Chief Justice Vanderbilt made the following statement:
Has a municipality the right to impose minimum floor area
requirements in the exercise of its zoning power? Much of the
proof adduced by the defendant Township was devoted to show-
ing that the mental and emotional health of its inhabitants de-
pended upon the proper size of their homes. We may take
notice without formal proof that there are minimums in housing
below which one may not go without risk of impairing the health
of those who dwell therein .... But quite apart from these con-
siderations of public health, which cannot be overlooked, mimi-
mum floor area standards are justified on the ground that they
promote the general welfare of the community .... The size of
the dwelling in any community inevitably affects the character
of the community and does much to determine whether or not it
is a desirable place in which to live.
23 Ibid.24 Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, appeal
to U.S. Sup. Ct. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 73 S.Ct.
386 (1953).
25 The case overruled is: Brookdale Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 123 N.J.L. 602, 10
A.2d 477, affirmed 126 N.J.L. 516, 19 A.2d 868 (1941) ;
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And he goes on to state:
Without some restrictions there is always the danger that after
some houses have been erected giving a character to the neigh-
borhood, others might follow which would fail to live up to the
standards thus voluntarily set.26
Not only does Chief Justice Vanderbilt justify minimum cubic footage
on the ground of health, but he recognizes a further justification for
setting such minimum cubic footage above that required by health.
Size, he states, affects the character of the community and does much
to make it a desirable place in which to live. In other words, the
aesthetic values of the community, such as conformity in size, justify
zoning regulations which call for minimum cubic footage.
The question of the validity of a zoning law requiring minimum
cubic footage has not been decided as yet in Wisconsin. However, our
court does use the following language in comparing the "Michigan"
and the "New Jersey" views as stated above:
The Elizabeth Lake Estates Case decision is directly contrary
to the well reasoned opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of
the New Jersey supreme court rendered in Lionshead Lake, Inc.,
v. Wayne Township, supra, upholding a township zoning ordin-
ance requiring homes to have a minimum square footage of
floor space. 27
Thus, it would seem that Wisconsin would hold zoning laws requiring
minimum cubic footage valid, and base its decision on aesthetics and
preservation of property values.
A final area which has been carved out of the general welfare in
establishing zoning laws based on aesthetics is public prosperity. Per-
haps the most notable development in this area has centered around
public parks and resorts. In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Indianapoliss the court held that no commercial signs could be placed
within 500 feet of a park area. Although the decision was based pri-
marily on the consideration of health under the police power, the court
spent considerable time demonstrating the benefit to the prosperity of
the community a more beautiful city creates. Undoubtedly this factor
was taken into consideration in sustaining the ordinance the natural
result of which was to beautify the city.
In City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Island Co. the Florida court
sustained a zoning law which permitted only hotel apartment sites on
an approach to Miami Beach. The court held:
In view of the nature of Miami Beach it is not important to con-
sider here the indispensibility of the restrictions to the health,
26 See supra, note 24.
27 See supra, note 6.
2S202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930), citing McQuillin text. See also: 8 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., §25.31, esp. note 88.
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the safety, the morals of the community but only their necessity
to the general welfare. We do not comprehend how it can be
succesfully urged that the maintenance of safety, health or
morals are involved but only whether in the circumstances in
this particular case the restrictions are so unnecessary to the
general welfare of the inhabitants that the curtailment of the
rights of the plaintiff are unreasonable and arbitrary.2 9
And the court goes on to state:
The limitation of the use by the plaintiff of his property seems a
fair, just and reasonable contribution to the economic good, the
prosperity, the welfare of the whole community and not so
burdensome that it contravenes the organic inhibition against
deprivation without due process.
Thus, the court sustained a zoning law based primarily upon aesthetics
because it promoted the general prosperity of the community.
Our Wisconsin court has not definitely decided this question as yet,
but its statements in State ex rel. Carter v. Harper indicate that the
general prosperity of the community is a proper objective of the police
power. It states:
In this day none will dispute that government in the exercise of
its police power may impose restrictions upon the use of property
in the interest of public health, morals and safety. That the
same restrictions may be imposed upon the use of property in
promotion of the public welfare, convenience, and general pros-
perity is perhaps not so well understood, but, nevertheless, is
firmly established by the decisions of this court and the federal
supreme court.30
Thus far it appears that courts by devious, indirect means are rapidly
recognizing the validity of zoning laws established for aesthetic reasons.
Although, as stated above, the general rule does not allow aesthetics,
alone, to justify zoning laws, there is a rapidly growing trend to the
contrary. McQuillin points out:
There is a definite tendency in support of the position that esthe-
tic considerations alone may justify the exercise of the police
power, at least under certain circumstances.... Undoubtedly in
this respect the law has undergone a decided change in recent
years .3
And the author goes on to state:
Esthetic considerations and a desire to maintain the quietude and
rural character of the community form a proper basis for the
enactment of a zoning ordinance.
29 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Island Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941).
30 State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269
(1923).
31 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., §25.31.
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The changed attitude on this question was clearly shown in a New
York case where the court stated:
This court is not restricted to aesthetic reasons in deciding to
sustain the validity of the ordinance in question, but if it were so
restricted, it would not hesitate to sustain the legislation upon
that ground alone.
32
It is true that much that is said in decisions recognizing aesthetics as
a basis for zoning laws is dicta. Nevertheless, it does show the attitude
of the courts.
The Florida court has recently held aesthetic considerations alone a
proper basis for a restriction on the size of signs in a commercial dis-
trict. It stated:
We have no hesitancy in agreeing with him (appellant property
owner) that the factors of health, safety and morals are not
involved in restricting the proportions of a signboard, but we dis-
agree with him in his position that the restriction cannot be
sustained upon aesthetic grounds alone.3
3
Our Wisconsin court has not authoritatively ruled on the question
of whether aesthetics alone are a proper basis for zoning laws. An
early reference to aesthetics was made in the case of State ex rel. Carter
v. Harper when the court stated:
It is not necessary for us to consider how far aesthetic con-
siderations furnish a justification for the exercise of the police
power. But one case has been called to our attention which
holds that aesthetic considerations alone justify the exertion of
that power. Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
Perhaps the case of State ex rel. Tivin City B. & L Co. v. Hough-
ton, 144 Minn. 1, 13, 174 N.W. 885, 176 N.W. 159, goes nearly
if not quite as far.34
The reasoning found in the Minnesota case referred to and approved
in the Kansas case is illustrative of the growing tendency today. It
states:
Another reason (for zoning) is that giving the people a means
to secure for that portion of the city, wherein they establish
their homes, fit and harmonious surroundings promotes con-
tentment, induces further efforts to enhance the appearance and
value of the home, fosters civic pride and thus tends to produce
a better type of citizen. It is time that courts recognized the
aesthetic as a factor in life. Beauty and fitness enhance values
32 Preferred Tire v. Village of Hempstead, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (1940).
See also: State v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923), where the
court states: "If by the term 'esthetic considerations' is meant a regard merely
for outward appearance, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the
neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying that
such consideration is not a matter of general welfare."
33 Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861 (1953).
s4 See supra, note 30.
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in public and private structures. But it is not sufficient that the
building is fit and proper, standing alone; it should also fit in
with surrounding structures to some degree. People are begin-
ning to realize this more than before and are calling for city
planning, by which the individual homes may be segregated from
not only industrial and mercantile districts, but also from the
districts devoted to hotels and apartments.3 5
In 1952 our Wisconsin court took the position that aesthetics alone
would not be sufficient.36 However, in 1955 the court by dicta indicated
that it was not entirely satisfied that its former position was correct
when it stated:
This court pointed out in Jefferson County v. Timmel, 1952, 261
Wis. 39, 61, 51 N.W.2d 518, that while the general rule is that
the zoning power may not be exercised for purely aesthetic
considerations, such rule was undergoing development. In view
of the latest word spoken on the subject by the U.S. supreme
court in Berman v. Parker, 1954, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99
L.Ed. , this development of the law has proceeded to the
point that renders it extremely doubtful that such prior rule is
any longer the law.37
The United States Supreme Court decision referred to involved slum
clearance, so that the court's position regarding aesthetics was primarily
dicta in the field of zoning. However, the court did state:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
Nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 8
CONCLUSION
We have here a conflict between two fundamental rights-the in-
dividual's property right of free use and the right of the public to
promotion and protection of aesthetics in pursuit of the general wel-
fare of the community. The basic question is whether aesthetic con-
siderations are of such importance as to warrant preservation by law.
That is, does the general welfare of the community demand the pro-
tection of the beauty of the community to the extent of limiting the
right of free use of property?
Zoning laws governing unreasonable architectural design and mini-
mum cubic footage for aesthetic purposes should be sustained. It is
true that every property owner has a right of free use. But with our
expanding communities there is another right which is gradually being
recognized with equal importance-a property right against illegitimate
and unfair non-conformity in use of the adjoining or neighboring land.
35 State ex rel. Twin City B. & I. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885,
176 N.W. 159 (1920).
36 Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952).
3 See supra, note 6.38 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, (1954).
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Perhaps before the development of large metropolitan areas aesthetic
considerations alone could not justify the use of the zoning power be-
cause the beauty of the community was not threatened as seriously as
it is today. However, if we are to preserve pleasant residential areas
today, aesthetic considerations in zoning laws are essential.
Fear has been expressed that such laws will lead to discrimination;
that is, only persons of a certain income bracket will be able to live in
a certain residential area because they alone will be able to comply
with the possible zoning standards. This situation could only arise with
an unreasonable administration of the law. For example, a valid zon-
ing law in a Wisconsin case stated that the "exterior architectural ap-
peal and functional plan of the proposed structure will not be so at
variance with those of other structures in the immediate neighborhood
as to cause substantial depreciation in property values thereof."' 39 Any
unreasonable interpretation of this standard by the board could be
appealed and set aside by the courts.
States have recognized the need to preserve the beauty of their cities,
but only a few have established aesthetics as a proper objective of the
police powers. However, the law is definitely changing. The right of
the individual to freedom of property use is gradually giving way to
the growing need of the general welfare of the community to establish
and preserve aesthetic aspects of the land.
Our Wisconsin court, which is quoted in McQuillin, summarized
the changing attitude toward aesthetics in zoning as follows:
It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in their
nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to
new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more re-
fined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be
endured. That which the common law did not condemn as
nuisance is now frequently outlawed as such by the written
law. This is not because the subject outlawed is of a different
nature, but because our sensibilities have become more refined
and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous smells have always
come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and discordant
surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities.
The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure
of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be per-
mitted to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities,
well may be pondered.40
Today aesthetics ought to be considered as encompassed within the
scope of the general welfare of the community, within the police
power; and, thus, within the zoning power.
JOSEPH SWIETLIK
39 See supra, note 6.
40 See supra, note 30.
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